We consider the effect of a renegotiable exclusive contract restricting a buyer to purchase from only one seller on the levels of noncontractible investments undertaken in their relationship. Contrary to some informal claims in the literature, we find that exclusivity has no effect when all investments are fully specific to the relationship (i.e., are purely ''internal''). Exclusivity does matter when investments affect the value of the buyer's trade with other sellers (i.e., have ''external'' effects). We examine the effects of exclusivity on investments and aggregate welfare, and the private incentives of the buyer-seller coalition to use it.
Introduction
Ⅲ A contract between a buyer and a seller is said to be exclusive if it prohibits one party to the contract from dealing with other agents. Although exclusivity provisions arise in many areas of economics (e.g., labor economics, economics of the family), they have attracted the most attention and controversy in the antitrust arena. A longstanding concern of courts, explored formally in a series of recent articles (Aghion and Bolton, 1987; Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley, 1991; Bernheim and Whinston, 1998; and Segal and Whinston, 2000) , is that exclusive contracts can serve anticompetitive purposes. At the same time, antitrust commentators often argue that such contracts serve procompetitive, efficiency-enhancing ends and, in particular, that they can protect the exclusive-rightholder's relationship-specific investments against opportunistic holdup.
A recent U.S. Department of Justice investigation into contracting practices in the computerized ticketing industry provides an example of this debate. In many major U.S. cities, the leading computerized ticketer, Ticketmaster, had exclusive contracts with ᭧ RAND 2000. concert venues having 80% to 95% of the available seating capacity in the city. To some observers, this fact raised a concern that these contracts limited competition in computerized ticketing services. Other observers, however, argued that these contracts were adopted instead to protect Ticketmaster's relationship-specific investments both in training a venue's personnel in the use of its computerized system and in tailoring its software to the specific configuration and ticketing needs of a venue.
Surprisingly, the economics literature contains no formal analysis of the role of exclusivity provisions in fostering specific investments. Moreover, the several (quite interesting) informal discussions of the issue that do exist make somewhat differing arguments. Klein (1988) and Frasco (1991) argue that exclusive contracts may be used instead of quantity contracts to protect a seller's relationship-specific investment when specification of quantities is too costly. Klein (1988) , for example, attributes the 1919 exclusive contract in which GM promised to buy all of its closed metal bodies from Fisher to the need to protect Fisher's investments in stamping machines and dies that were specific to GM's car designs.
1 (Klein (1988) also discusses the eventual replacement of this contract by vertical integration due to Fisher's holdup of GM under the contract, a point we shall discuss further below.) In contrast, Marvel (1982) and Masten and Snyder (1993) also argue that exclusivity may be adopted to protect a seller's investments, but they focus on investments that the buyer can use in its dealings with other sellers. Masten and Snyder (1993) , for example, suggest that the penalty clauses in the United Shoe Machinery Corporation's leases were in part a response to United's concern that its expenditures on educating shoe manufacturers in the efficient production of shoes could be used by these manufacturers in conjunction with competitors' shoe machines. Finally, Areeda and Kaplow (1988) argue that exclusives may be adopted by a manufacturer to induce retailer ''loyalty,'' that is, to encourage the retailer to tailor his promotional efforts toward the manufacturer's product. In this case, the investing party is the buyer in the relationship, who may make investments that affect his returns from purchasing various sellers' products.
In this article we examine formally the conditions under which exclusive contracts may be privately and/or socially valuable for protecting noncontractible investments. For this purpose, we develop a model in which a buyer (B) and a seller (S) initially contract, while facing the possibility that B may later wish to buy from an external source (E). 2 B and S can write an exclusive contract ex ante, which prohibits B from buying from E. After the contract is signed, but before trade, the parties may undertake noncontractible investments that affect the value of ex post trades. 3 We assume that an exclusive contract can be renegotiated ex post whenever trading with E is efficient. The role of exclusivity is therefore to establish the disagreement point for renegotiation. As in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) , the disagreement point is important because it affects the allocation of ex post surplus, which in turn determines the parties' investment incentives.
Since the effect of an exclusivity provision may depend on the other terms included in B and S's contract, an important modelling choice concerns the set of feasible contract terms. In most of the article we focus on the ''incomplete contract'' setting in which the terms of future trade cannot be specified in advance (see Hart, 1995) . Thus, the only possible term in the initial contract, aside from a lump-sum side payment, is ᭧ RAND 2000. the exclusivity provision. Although an extreme assumption (e.g., Ticketmaster's contracts did include price terms, as did the GM-Fisher contract), it is intended to capturealbeit in a stark form-the difficulty of contractually specifying all aspects of performance. 4 Our focus on this case allows us to study the effects of exclusivity in the simplest possible setting in which incompleteness is present, which still involves significant complications. In Section 6, however, we provide a preliminary discussion of the effects of exclusivity when more complicated contracts can be signed because some aspects of future trade are contractible. There we show how a number of our central conclusions generalize to such settings.
We begin in Section 2 by considering a simple example in which the seller may make a noncontractible ex ante investment that reduces his cost of serving the buyer ex post (along the lines discussed in Klein (1988) and Frasco (1991) ). In this context we discover a surprising result: exclusivity provisions have no effect whatsoever on the level of relationship-specific investment undertaken by the seller. Although exclusivity does increase the seller's share of ex post surplus (in accord with the conventional wisdom), it does not increase the sensitivity of the seller's payoff to his investment.
In Section 3 we introduce a far more general model of investments and holdup. Using this model, we show that the key feature leading to the irrelevance result of Section 2 is that the investment we considered was internal; that is, it did not affect the value of trade between B and E. In any such case, exclusivity will have no effect, a finding that we label ''the irrelevance result.'' For exclusivity to matter for noncontractible investments in our model, these investments must have some external effects: they must affect the value of trade between B and E. Thus, the informal arguments of Klein (1988) and Frasco (1991) -in which investments are internal-find no support in our model. The investments envisioned by Marvel (1982) , Masten and Snyder (1993) , and Areeda and Kaplow (1988) , in contrast, do have external effects.
In Section 4 we examine the effects of exclusivity when investments have an external effect for the special case in which one party invests and the investment is one-dimensional. We begin there with a comparative statics result establishing the direction of the effect of exclusivity on such an investment. We find that exclusivity encourages S to make investments that increase external value, but it discourages B and E from doing so. We then study the welfare effects of exclusivity. These effects depend critically not only on which party is making the investment, but also on the nature of the investment. Specifically, we highlight the differences in welfare results for cases in which investment moves the values of internal and external trade in the same direction (''complementary investment effects'') compared to cases in which investment moves these values in opposite directions (''substitutable investment effects''). These results are summarized in Figure 1 , which appears at the end of the second subsection of Section 4. Figure 1 marks the end of the central part of the article. The remainder of the article is concerned with extensions of this analysis. In the third subsection of Section 4, we begin by showing that some further welfare results are possible in cases in which we know something about the complementarity/substitutability of S and E's products 4 Klein (1988, p. 201) , for example, stresses how even contracts that attempt to specify the terms of exchange are often very incomplete. In discussing the GM-Fisher exclusive contract he notes that ''In spite of the existence of a long-term contractual arrangement with explicitly set price and price protection clauses, there is still some probability that a hold-up may occur. This is because not all elements of future performance are specified in the contract. Due to uncertainty and the difficulty of specifying all elements of performance in a contractually enforceable way, contracts will necessarily be incomplete to one degree or another.'' See also Hart (1995) for a discussion of this assumption and Segal (1999) for a formal justification.
in B's payoff function and the effect of the level of trade on the marginal returns to investment.
In reality, the investments undertaken by the contracting parties are often multidimensional, and often more than one party is making investments. In Section 5 we show how our results can be generalized to these cases. Central to our analysis in this section is a focus on the nature of complementarity or substitutability between internal and external activities. Because of the role of complementarities in the theory, the monotone comparative statics tools presented in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) are particularly helpful for our problem, and we rely on them extensively in our analysis in this section.
In Section 6 we provide a preliminary discussion of how our conclusions are affected when the buyer and seller can write more complex ex ante contracts, such as contracts that specify future trade or contracts that give the buyer an option to buy at a specified price (e.g., a requirements contract). We show how a number of our central conclusions (including our irrelevance result) extend to such settings, and we identify some that do not. The analysis in this section is closely related to the extensive recent literature on contractual solutions to the holdup problem (e.g., Hart and Moore, 1988; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993; Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996; Che and Hausch, 1999; and Segal and Whinston, forthcoming) . In particular, of central importance in this discussion is the question of the incremental benefit of an exclusivity provision when these other price and quantity provisions are possible.
Section 7 offers concluding remarks, including a discussion of related work in other literatures. The issue of exclusivity and investment incentives arises in a number of fields of economics (e.g., labor economics) in which our results may have fruitful application.
A simple example
Ⅲ Consider a situation in which a buyer (B) and a seller (S) initially contract, while facing the possibility that the buyer may later wish to buy from an external source (E). At the initial contracting stage, B and S can sign an exclusive contract that prohibits B from trading with E but cannot specify a positive trade because the nature of the trade is hard to describe in advance. Suppose that B demands either zero or one unit of the good, which she values at v, that S's cost of producing the good is c S , and that E's cost of producing the good is c E . While all three values can in general depend on the parties' ex ante investments, we begin by considering only S's investment in reducing his cost c S . We denote by S (c S ) the ex ante investment cost for S of achieving cost level c S .
According to Frasco (1991) and Klein (1988) , the seller's incentive to engage in this kind of specific investment is enhanced by an exclusive contract. The intuition behind their claims is simple: exclusivity enables the seller to extract a greater share of the available surplus in ex post bargaining, and thereby encourages the seller's ex ante investments. In this section we examine the validity of these claims in a very simple model (we generalize the model substantially in Section 3).
We assume that after E appears, the three parties renegotiate to an ex post efficient outcome (we assume that c S , v, and c E are observable). 5 In particular, if E is the more efficient supplier, renegotiation results in B buying from E, even if an exclusive contract ᭧ RAND 2000. was written. The original contract is still important, however, because it affects the distribution of ex post surplus among the parties, which affects ex ante investment incentives.
We assume a very specific formulation of ex post bargaining. First, we suppose that E receives no surplus in the bargaining. This would happen, for example, if there was competition among many identical external suppliers. Second, we assume that B and S split their renegotiation surplus 50/50 over the disagreement point, which is determined by the original contract. Let e ϭ 1 denote an exclusive contract and e ϭ 0 denote a nonexclusive one (or, equivalently, the absence of any contract), and let U (c S , e) and 0 S U (c S , e) denote the two parties' disagreement utilities, which may in general depend 0 B on S's ex post cost c S and the contract term e.
6 Then the renegotiation surplus can be written as
the total available ex post surplus. Ignoring any ex ante side payments (which have no effect on investment incentives), S's ex post utility can be written as
The seller's ex ante investment decision is to choose c S to maximize U S (c S , e ϭ 1) Ϫ S (c S ) under an exclusive contract, and U S (c S , e ϭ 0) Ϫ S (c S ) under a nonexclusive one. Consider first a nonexclusive contract. In this case, the parties' utilities at the disagreement point are U (c S , e ϭ 0) ϭ 0 and
buy from E at price c E whenever she desires). Observe that these disagreement utilities do not depend on c S ; hence, the only term in (1) that is sensitive to c S is ½TS(c S ). Therefore, S captures only half of his investment's contribution to total surplus, which implies that his incentive to invest is socially suboptimal. Can this underinvestment be mitigated with an exclusive contract? Under such a contract, the parties' disagreement utilities are U (c S , e ϭ 1) ϭ U (c S , e ϭ 1) ϭ 0 (B 0 0 S B cannot buy from anyone without S's permission). Substituting into (1), we can write
Equation (2) tells us that the functions U S (c S , e ϭ 1) and U S (c S , e ϭ 0) differ by an amount that is independent of c S . Hence, we see that exclusivity is irrelevant for the seller's optimal investment level. 7 Recall that the claims of Frasco (1991) and Klein (1988) are based on the intuition that exclusivity enables S to extract a higher share of the total surplus in ex post bargaining. While this intuition by itself is correct (S's payoff is indeed larger under an exclusive contract), under our assumptions the additional surplus extracted by S due to exclusivity is not sensitive to his investment, and therefore it does not affect his investment incentives.
This simple model, and its result, can be related in an interesting way to the asset ownership model of Hart and Moore (1990) . Imagine a situation in which there is a single asset that B must have access to in order to trade with E. Then, ownership of ᭧ RAND 2000. this asset by S is equivalent to the exclusive contract considered above, while a nonexclusive contract corresponds to ownership of the asset by B or E. In the present example, only S makes an investment, while B is indispensable for trade. It follows from the results of Hart and Moore (1990) that ownership of the asset by either S or B is optimal-that is, that exclusivity is irrelevant. This ''asset interpretation'' of exclusivity will apply in our general model as well. However, our analysis in later sections will concern environments that fall outside the settings considered by Hart and Moore (1990) . 8 It is natural to wonder precisely what is responsible for the irrelevance of exclusivity for investment incentives in this simple model. We observe first that this irrelevance depends on two assumptions about bargaining. The first of these is that exclusivity may be renegotiated ex post. Suppose, instead, that while B and S are able to negotiate their terms of trade ex post, they cannot renegotiate the exclusivity provision itself. In this case, exclusivity would affect not only B's disagreement utility-which would still be U (c S , e ϭ 1) ϭ 0 under an exclusive-but also the total surplus available to the parties, 0 B which would now be given by the function TS(c S ) ϭ max{v Ϫ c S , 0}. This differs from TS(c S ) whenever c E Ͻ c S Ͻ v, and in such cases we have
As a result, unless trade with S is always efficient (regardless of investments), a nonrenegotiable exclusive contract may increase S's cost-reducing investment by increasing the frequency of trade between B and S.
9 Of course, in the present environment, B and S must negotiate ex post in order to trade. Given this fact, it is difficult to see why they would negotiate terms of trade but forgo any opportunities for mutual benefit through procurement from E.
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The second assumption is that B and S split the surplus available over their disagreement payoffs in fixed proportions. The leading alternative treatment of bargaining would involve B and S engaging in ''outside option bargaining'' (see Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky, 1986) . Under outside option bargaining, the parties split total surplus in fixed proportions (say, 50/50) as long as both receive more than their disagreement utilities (outside options); otherwise, one party's outside option binds and it receives its disagreement utility level while the other party receives the remaining surplus. In the present setting, this means that B receives U B (c S , e) ϭ max{½TS(c S ), U (c S , e)},
The fundamental difference between this bargaining outcome and that considered above is that it depends on the disagreement utilities in a nonlinear way. Assume for simplicity that we always have c S Ͻ c E Ͻ v, and consequently
In words, in the absence of an exclusive contract, S extracts half of his investment's marginal contribution to total surplus when B's outside option is not binding, and all of this contribution when B's outside option is binding. The effect of an exclusive contract is to reduce B's outside option to zero, in which case S always receives half of total surplus: U S (c S , e ϭ 1) ϭ ½(v Ϫ c S ). Therefore, with outside option bargaining, even though exclusivity still increases S's share of ex post surplus, it actually discourages S's cost-reducing investment (contrary to the claims of Klein (1988) and Frasco (1991)).
11,12
In the remainder of the article, however, we maintain (in a generalized way) the bargaining structure of the simple example above and focus on two other dimensions of the contracting environment: the nature of the investments and the identities of the investing parties. These two dimensions turn out to have important ramifications for the equilibrium use and efficiency properties of exclusive contracts. We begin in the next section by introducing a substantially more general model and using it to identify the feature of S's investment decision that was responsible for the irrelevance result above.
3. The general model and the irrelevance result Ⅲ The model. As before, the model has three parties, B, S, and E. At date 0, B and S sign a contract. We continue to make the ''incomplete contracting'' assumption that future trades cannot be described in advance. For this reason, B and S cannot specify a positive trade in an ex ante contract. At the same time, we assume that it is possible to describe ex ante and verify ex post the fact that B does not conduct any trade with another seller, which makes exclusive contracts possible. Specifically, along with a lump-sum side payment, which has no effect on investment incentives and will thus be ignored throughout the article, the contract specifies a variable e ∈ {0, 1} that indicates whether S has exclusive rights over trade with B ex post (as before, e ϭ 1 indicates an exclusive contract).
At date 1 (ex ante), each party j ∈ N ϭ {B, S, E} makes an investment choice a j ∈ A j that stochastically affects valuations for future trades, at a cost of j (a j ).
At date 2 (ex post), the state of nature ∈ ⌰ is revealed and negotiations over trade occur. B can potentially purchase both from S and from E. We denote by q j ∈ Q j the quantity B buys from seller j ∈ {S, E}. The parties' ex post payoffs are determined by these trades, the ex ante investments, the monetary transfers among the parties, and the realization of uncertainty. Letting t j denote the monetary payment from B to party j ∈ {S, E}, these payoffs are as follows:
11 Similar points are made by de Meza and Lockwood (1998) and Chiu (1998) (who note the reversal of some of Hart and Moore's (1990) results under outside option bargaining), Felli and Roberts (2000) (who discuss the role of competition in encouraging investments with Bertrand bidding), and Bolton and Whinston (1993) (who show that competition for inputs may induce first-best investments by buyers in a model with outside option bargaining).
12 MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) study outside option bargaining in a model in which the price for trade can be contracted in advance and show that the first best can be attained (without exclusivity) when only one party invests. In our model, with incomplete contracts, the first best is unattainable with outside option bargaining whenever (·) is differentiable and there is a positive probability that
Note that we allow for B's valuation to be affected both by B's own investments and by the investments of S and E; likewise, the production cost of seller j ∈ {S, E} may be affected both by j's own investments and by B's investments. We let (0, 0) ∈ Q ϭ Q S ϫ Q E stand for ''no trade,'' and we assume (for notational convenience) that
We assume that the ex post allocation (q j , t j ) j∈{S,E} arises from a three-party bargaining process. We model this bargaining using cooperative game theory, by assuming that each player receives an ex post payoff that is a linear function of the player's marginal contributions to the various possible coalitions of which it can be a member.
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This approach encompasses as special cases a number of bargaining models, both cooperative and noncooperative, that have been used previously in the literature.
Absent an ex post agreement on trade, the default trade and transfer outcome is q j ϭ t j ϭ 0 for all j ∈ {S, E}. Thus, under a nonexclusive contract (e ϭ 0) the surplus that can be achieved ex post through an efficient agreement among the members of coalition J given investments a ϭ (a B , a S , a E ) and state , denoted by
In contrast, under an exclusive contract (e ϭ 1), the members of coalition J can agree to a positive trade level if and only if coalition J includes S. Moreover, if S is a member of J, the existence of the exclusive contract in no way limits the set of trades that J's members can agree to. Thus, letting V J (a, ) denote the surplus achievable by coalition J under an exclusive contract given investments a and state of the world , we have V J (a, ) ϭ V J (a, ) for J {BE}, and V BE (a, ) ϭ 0. Note, in particular, that the only difference in achievable surplus occurs for coalition BE, which cannot trade in the presence of an exclusive contract. We can therefore define coalition J's value under a contract with exclusivity provision e given investments a and state of the world bŷ
where the ␣ 's are nonnegative parameters satisfying the adding-up restriction J j (introduced below for our specific model) that the sum of the agents' payoffs always equals V BSE (a, e, ).
14 In the present setting, where V j (a, , e) ϭ 0 for all j ∈ N and V SE (a, , e) ϭ 0, the bargaining solution (5) reduces to
.
Substituting from (4) into (6), we obtain
The adding-up restriction then requires that
Our primary motivation for taking this approach to bargaining is that it nests a number of bargaining models previously used in the literature, most notably split-thesurplus bargaining with a competitive external source and the Shapley value. The former solution, used in the simple example of Section 2, arises when ␣ ϭ 0 for all J E nonempty J ʚ N\E, and ␣ ϭ ␣ ϭ 0. The Shapley value is obtained by imposing the
symmetry property that ␣ is only a function of ͦJͦ, and not of the identities of player
A j denote the set of Nash equilibria in the game in ͟j∈N which each party j's strategy is its investment choice a j ∈ A j , and j's payoff is
Note that in general the investment game can have multiple Nash equilibria, so that A*(e) need not be single-valued.
14 This bargaining solution can be characterized by the linearity, dummy, monotonicity, and Pareto optimality axioms (Weber (1988) ). It can also be implemented in a noncooperative game in which the players are randomly ordered (with a distribution chosen to implement the desired weights on marginal contributions (Weber (1988) ), and sequentially make take-it-or-leave-it offers to all preceding players. Note that this noncooperative implementation need not involve direct communication between S and E (which may be prohibited by antitrust law) since there are no gains from trade between the sellers, and whenever one seller (say, S) is preceded by the complementary coalition (BE ), he can extract his marginal contribution by making an offer to B and then letting B make an offer to S. 15 Our bargaining solution also covers some cases of the noncooperative bargaining model of Spier and Whinston (1995) .
Finally, up to this point, we have restricted attention to either a fully exclusive (e ϭ 1) or a fully nonexclusive (e ϭ 0) contract. In what follows, we treat exclusivity continuously by letting e ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that S has an exclusive right.
This change leads to no alteration in the specification of our bargaining payoffs in (7).
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In a model in which many periods of trade follow the parties' investments, one could (more realistically) interpret e as representing the duration of the exclusivity provision.
▫ The irrelevance result. Given this general model of investment and holdup, we can now state more general conditions under which the irrelevance result of our simple example (in Section 2) holds.
Proposition 1 (the irrelevance result).
If v(q S ϭ 0, q E , a, ) and c E (q E , a, ) do not depend on the investments a ϭ (a B , a S , a E ), then A*(e) does not depend on the degree of exclusivity e.
Proof. Under the stated conditions, V BE (a, ) does not depend on a. Given this, and the payoffs in (7), it is immediate that the set of Nash equilibria is unaffected by e. Q.E.D.
The idea behind the result is simple. Recall that the exclusivity parameter e effects only the value of coalition BE. If investments do not affect the value of BE, then exclusivity does not affect the marginal returns to investment for any of the agents. This was precisely the case in the simple example of Section 2: there, S's investment lowered S's production cost but had no effect on either E's cost or B's value from consuming E's product. Hence, S's investment in that example had no impact on the value of coalition BE, and consequently exclusivity had no effect on investment incentives. Proposition 1, of course, applies to more cases than just investment by S in cost reduction; we may for example have investment by S that enhances his product or investments by B in learning to use S's product more effectively. As long as investments do not affect the value of trade between B and E, exclusivity will be irrelevant for investment incentives.
Effects of exclusivity with one-dimensional investment
Ⅲ According to Proposition 1, for exclusivity to affect ex ante investments, these investments must affect the value of trade between B and E. In the remainder of the article we study the effect of exclusivity in such cases. The investments discussed by Marvel (1982) , Masten and Snyder (1993) , and Areeda and Kaplow (1988) all have this feature (recall that in Marvel (1982) and Masten and Snyder (1993) a seller's investment raises the buyer's payoff from trading both with that seller and with others; in Areeda and Kaplow (1988) , a retailer (the buyer) chooses which seller to favor in making promotional investments). Similarly, in the GM-Fisher relationship discussed by Klein (1988) , GM (the buyer in its relation with Fisher) was presumably making substantial general investments in the production, distribution, and marketing of automobiles, whose value did not depend greatly on the source of GM's automobile bodies.
We focus in this section on the simplest possible case, in which only one party invests and its investment is one-dimensional, i.e., A ʚ ᑬ. In the next section we show that our results can be extended to cases in which more than one party may have investment choices and these choices may be multidimensional.
To see the effect of exclusivity on a one-dimensional investment that affects external value, consider again the parties' ex post payoffs (7), which we restate here:
Examination of these payoffs suggests that an increase in e will increase S's incentive to make an investment that raises V BE and will lower the incentives of B or E to do so. We formalize this intuition in Proposition 2 below. For expositional purposes, throughout the remainder of this section we shall assume that the set A is compact, the functions V J (·) are continuously differentiable, and the equilibrium investment level for any level of exclusivity e is unique. 17 We denote this equilibrium investment level by a*(e).
In Proposition 2, we assume that ‫ץ‬E [V BE (a, )]/‫ץ‬a Ͼ 0. The key assumption is that the sign of this derivative is unchanging (the fact that the derivative is positive merely reflects the way we choose to measure the investment). In addition, for exclusivity to affect party j's investment, the party's payoff must be responsive to external value; that is, changes in the level of E [V BE (a, )] must change the payoff of party j. Formally, this requires that ␣ Ͼ 0. When this is so, we can state the comparative {BE}\ j j static effects of exclusivity as follows:
Proposition 2. Suppose that A ʚ ᑬ, the investing party's payoff is responsive to external value, ‫ץ‬E [V BE (a, )]/‫ץ‬a Ͼ 0 for all a ∈ A, and a*(e) ∈ intA for all e.
Then (i) if only S invests, a*(e) is increasing in e. (ii) if only B invests, a*(e) is decreasing in e. (iii) if only E invests, a*(e) is decreasing in e.
Proof. In case (i), the investing party's expected payoff has increasing marginal returns in (a, e) (that is, ‫ץ‬ 2 E [ f S (a, e, )]/‫ץ‬a‫ץ‬e Ͼ 0), while in cases (ii) and (iii) it has decreasing marginal returns in (a, e). The results follow by Theorem 1 of Edlin and Shannon (1998) 
. Q.E.D.
Using the analogy to asset ownership introduced in Section 2, these findings are related to the idea of Hart and Moore (1990) that asset ownership increases a party's incentive to invest. Thus, transferring the ''exclusivity asset'' from B or E to S increases S's investment but reduces B's or E's.
In general, a party's investment may affect the values of both external and internal trades. An important distinction then arises between cases in which investment moves the values of external and internal trade in the same direction and cases in which they move in opposite directions. For example, in Marvel (1982) and Masten and Snyder (1993) , as well as the case of GM's general investments, investment moves external and internal values in the same direction. Formally, in these cases, investment increases (at least weakly) all coalitional values: V BE , V BS , and V BSE . In such cases, we will say that the investment has complementary (internal and external) effects. (A set of sufficient 17 All the results in this section apply to the case in which the set of equilibrium investments A*(e) is not a singleton by interpreting a*(·) as any single-valued selection from the set of equilibrium investments. The assumptions that A is compact and the functions V J (·) are continuously differentiable can be dispensed with at the cost of a slightly more complicated assumption in Propositions 3(ii), 4(i), and 6 (we must still assume that the investing party's payoff is differentiable in a). 18 If a*(e) ∉ intA, then a small change in e could leave the optimal investment unchanged. Nevertheless, it is still true that when exclusivity does have an effect, it is in the direction we identify here. In Section 5 we will formulate weak comparative statics results that do not rely on differentiability of the objective function or interiority of the equilibrium investments.
conditions for complementary investment effects is given by ‫ץ‬v(q S , q E , a, )/‫ץ‬a Ն 0, ‫ץ‬c S (q S , a, )/‫ץ‬a Յ 0, and ‫ץ‬c E (q E , a, )/‫ץ‬a Յ 0.) According to Proposition 2, with complementary investment effects, internal value will increase with exclusivity if S is the investing party and will decrease if B or E is.
In contrast, in Areeda and Kaplow's (1988) discussion of a retailer's allocation of promotional effort, investment moves external and internal values in opposite directions. In this case, if investment is normalized to increase the value of external trade V BE , then it (at least weakly) reduces the value V BS of internal trade, and its effect on total ex post surplus V BSE is in general ambiguous. In such cases, we will say that the investment has substitutable (internal and external) effects. (A set of sufficient conditions for substitutable investment effects is given by ‫ץ‬v(q S ϭ 0, q E , a, )/‫ץ‬a Ն 0, ‫ץ‬c E (q E , a, )/‫ץ‬a Յ 0, ‫ץ‬v(q S , q E ϭ 0, a, )/‫ץ‬a Յ 0, and ‫ץ‬c S (q S , a, )/‫ץ‬a Ն 0.) With substitutable investment effects, internal value is decreased by exclusivity if S is the investing party and is increased if B or E is.
The distinction between complementary and substitutable investment effects not only determines the direction of the effect of exclusivity on internal values, but also has important effects on the incentive of the buyer-seller coalition to write an exclusive contract, as well as on the aggregate welfare effects of this arrangement. We analyze these effects in the remainder of this section.
▫ Welfare effects of exclusivity with complementary investment effects. In this subsection, we examine the effects of exclusive contracts on total welfare, on the joint payoff of B and S (to determine the private incentives to write an exclusive contract), and on E's payoff (to determine the external effect of an exclusive contract) in situations of complementary investment effects. Letting U J (a, e) ϭ U j (a, e) denote the total ͚j∈J ex ante surplus of a coalition J ʚ N, 19 we have the following result:
Proposition 3. Suppose that A ʚ ᑬ, the investing party's payoff is responsive to external value, ‫ץ‬E [V BE (a, )]/‫ץ‬a Ͼ 0 for all a ∈ A, and a*(e) ∈ intA for all e. If investment has complementary effects, it follows that (i) if only S invests, then U BS (a*(e), e) is increasing in e.
(ii) if only B invests, E is competitive, and ‫ץ‬E V BSE (a, )/‫ץ‬a Ͼ 0, then U BS (a*(e), e) is decreasing in e for e close enough to one.
(iii) if only E invests, then U E (a*(e), e) is decreasing in e.
Proof. Take eЈ, e Љ ∈ [0, 1], with eЉ Ͼ eЈ, and let aЈ ϵ a*(eЈ) and aЉ ϵ a*(eЉ).
(i) By Proposition 2, aЉ Ͼ aЈ, hence with complementary investment effects, we must have U B (aЉ, eЉ) Ն U B (aЈ, e Љ). Also, by S's revealed preference,
Therefore, we can write 
Therefore, if eЈ ∈ (e, 1], we can write
where the last equality uses the assumption that E is competitive.
(iii) We can write
where the first inequality is by E's revealed preference and the second inequality uses the fact that U E (a, e) is nonincreasing in e keeping a fixed. Q.E.D.
The proof of part (i) is based on the fact that S's investment has a positive externality on B; by raising this investment, exclusivity increases B and S's joint surplus. This result corresponds well with the arguments of Marvel (1982) and Masten and Snyder (1993) that a buyer and seller may sign an exclusive contract to encourage the seller's investment that has an external benefit for the buyer. Note, moreover, that when E is competitive, we have U BS ϵ U BSE , and the exclusive arrangement is necessarily efficient. (When E is not competitive and the arrangement reduces E's payoff, it may not be socially efficient.)
The assumption in part (ii) that ‫ץ‬E V BSE (a, )/‫ץ‬a Ͼ 0 represents a slight strengthening of the condition that ‫ץ‬E V BSE (a, )/‫ץ‬a Ն 0, which holds with complementary investment effects. The proof of part (ii) is based on the fact that under the assumptions of the proposition, B's investment has a positive externality on S when e is close to one. Hence, by reducing this investment, exclusivity reduces B and S's joint surplus. In such a case, B and S never find it optimal to sign a fully exclusive contract. The result seems consistent with the difficulties, noted by Klein (1988) , that arose under the GM-Fisher exclusive contract. If, as seems likely, GM was making important general investments, this result provides support for GM's conclusion that the exclusive contract was not working to its advantage. Part (iii) of the proposition tells us that when E's investment is an entry cost, exclusivity will discourage entry, as in Aghion and Bolton (1987) . The social effect of exclusivity in this case is unclear: it may be socially optimal to prevent entry by E that is motivated by ''business stealing'' concerns (as in Mankiw and Whinston, 1986 ). What we do know is that because of the negative externality that exclusivity has on E, B and S have a socially excessive incentive to use it, just as in Aghion and Bolton (1987) .
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▫ Welfare effects of exclusivity with substitutable investment effects. Welfare results in the case of substitutable investment effects are more limited, and a number of our results rely on the assumption that it is never ex post optimal to use the external source, so that V BS (a, ) ϵ V BSE (a, ). Since the proofs of this and the remaining results of this section are very similar to that of Proposition 3, we relegate them to the Appendix.
Proposition 4.
Suppose that A ʚ ᑬ, the investing party's payoff is responsive to external value, ‫ץ‬E V BE (a, )/‫ץ‬a Ͼ 0 for all a ∈ A, and a*(e) ∈ intA for all e. If investment has substitutable effects, it follows that (i) if only S invests, E is competitive, external trade is never optimal, ␣ ϩ ␣ Ͼ 0,
and ‫ץ‬V BS (a, )/‫ץ‬a Ͻ 0, then U BS (a*(e), e) is decreasing in e for e close enough to one.
(ii) if only B invests and external trade is never optimal, then U BS (a*(e), e) is increasing in e.
The conclusion of part (ii) of the proposition is consistent with the dealer loyalty motivation for exclusive dealing discussed by Areeda and Kaplow (1988) . It establishes that when B invests, its investment has substitutable effects, and external trade is never optimal, B and S will sign a fully exclusive contract. When E is competitive, B and S's decision is also socially optimal, although when E is not competitive the effect on aggregate welfare is in general ambiguous. Continuing our analogy to Hart and Moore's (1990) model of asset ownership, note that this result indicates that with substitutable investments rather than the complementary investments assumed by Hart and Moore, it may be optimal to give ownership of the ''exclusivity asset'' to a noninvesting party. 22 The assumption in part (i) that ‫ץ‬V BS (a, )/‫ץ‬a Ͻ 0 represents a slight strengthening of the condition that ‫ץ‬V BS (a, )/‫ץ‬a Յ 0, which holds with substitutable investment effects, while ␣ ϩ ␣ Ͼ 0 implies that S's payoff is increasing in V BS . Part (i) of the
proposition tells us that when S invests and its investment has substitutable effects, E is competitive, and external trade is never optimal ex post, B and S will not sign a fully exclusive contract. (We are unaware of any discussion in the literature of a case in which S makes such a substitutable investment.) Finally, part (iii) tells us that when E is the investing party, E is worse off when B and S sign an exclusive contract (just as in the complementary effects case).
For convenience, in Figure 1 we summarize the welfare effects identified so far for investments having external effects for the case in which E is a competitive external source.
21 This is not the only negative externality that can arise from exclusive contracts; Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) consider the externalities that exclusive contracts have on other buyers (which are absent from our model).
22 Rajan and Zingales (1998) observe that welfare may be increased by taking an asset away from the only investing party when Hart and Moore's (1990) assumptions on complementarity of investments are not satisfied. Cai (1998) makes the related observation that joint ownership can be optimal in such cases when more than one party invests.
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FIGURE 1
With a competitive external source, the welfare effect of an increase in e is equal to its effect on the joint surplus of B and S (that is, U BSE (a*(e)) ϭ U BS (a*(e), e) for all e). Thus, for example, Proposition 3 part (i) tells us that when E is competitive, an increase in exclusivity raises welfare when S is the party investing and S's investments display complementary investment effects.
Overall, the figure provides a simple checklist for evaluating the logical consistency of efficiency-based claims for exclusive contracts when the supply side of the market is argued to be competitive and the investment has an external effect. To use the figure, one need only ask ''Who is making the investment?'' and ''Does the investment have complementary or substitutable effects?'' Given the answers to these two questions, Figure 1 indicates whether efficiency concerns would in fact lead to the adoption of an exclusivity provision.
The results up to this point constitute the core of our study of the effects of exclusivity on noncontractible investments. The remaining sections of the article can all be viewed as extensions of this analysis. We begin these efforts at generalization in the next subsection by deriving some further welfare results for cases in which we know something about the complementarity/substitutability of S and E's products in B's payoff function, and the effect of the level of trade on the marginal returns to investment.
▫ Further welfare results. The welfare results in the previous two subsections rely only on whether investment has complementary or substitutable effects (along with various differentiability assumptions). For example, they hold regardless of whether S and E's products are complements or substitutes. However, in some situations we may know more about the underlying valuations and costs of the parties and about the effects of the investment. In this subsection we derive some further welfare results based on assumptions about how the investment a affects the marginal
Before presenting these results, we first identify conditions on the underlying valuation and cost functions that imply that these marginal contributions are either increasing or decreasing in a. To do so, we make assumptions about two basic types of interactions:
(i) Interaction of the two products in the buyer's payoff function. This is captured in the differentiable case by the cross-partial derivative ‫ץ‬ 2 v(q S , q E , a, )/‫ץ‬q S ‫ץ‬q E . If the products are complements, this cross-partial is positive; it is negative if they are substitutes.
(ii) Interactions between investment and trades. These are captured by the crosspartial derivatives ‫ץ‬ 2 v(q S , q E , a, )/‫ץ‬q S ‫ץ‬a, ‫ץ‬ 2 v(q S , q E , a, )/‫ץ‬q E ‫ץ‬a, Ϫ‫ץ‬ 2 c S (q S , a, )/‫ץ‬q S ‫ץ‬a, and Ϫ‫ץ‬ 2 c E (q E , a, )/‫ץ‬q E ‫ץ‬a. In what follows, we assume that internal (external) trades are complementary to investment changes that raise internal (external) values. This means that the investment's effect on the parties' marginal valuations for internal (external) trade is of the same sign as its effect on their total valuations for this trade. With complementary investment effects, this involves all of the above cross-partial derivatives being positive. With substitutable investment effects, this involves instead negative cross-partial derivatives between q S and a.
Assumptions on these interactions allow us to sign the effects of investment on the two sellers' marginal contributions to the grand coalition:
23 Lemma 1. Suppose that internal (external) trades are complementary with investment changes that raise internal (external) value. If S and E's products are complements in the complementary investment effects case, thenˆˆ‫ץ‬
BSE BS BSE BE
If S and E's products are substitutes in the substitutable investment effects case, thenˆˆ‫ץ‬
Lemma 1 tells us that these marginal contributions will be increasing when products are complementary and we are in a situation of complementary investment effects, while they will be decreasing if products are substitutes and we are in a situation of substitutable investment effects.
We should emphasize that the conditions in Lemma 1 are sufficient, but not necessary, for signing the effects of investment on these marginal contributions. For example, suppose that q S and q E are substitute products and that B wishes to consume at most one unit. Suppose also that B's valuations are v S (a) for S's good and v E (a) for E's good, and that v (a) Ͼ v (a) Ͼ 0. Costs are unaffected by investments. Finally, Ј Ј S E assume as well that external trade is never efficient. Then we have
products are substitutes. For the complementary investments effects case, we have the following additional welfare results when these marginal contributions are increasing in the investment a: Proposition 5. Suppose that A ʚ ᑬ, the investing party's payoff is responsive to external value, ‫ץ‬E [V BE (a, )]/‫ץ‬a Ͼ 0 for all a ∈ A, and a*(e) ∈ intA for all e. Suppose, in addition, that investment has complementary effects and that
if only S invests, then U BSE (a*(e), e) is increasing in e.
(ii) if only B invests, then U BSE (a*(e), e) is decreasing in e and U E (a*(e), e) is nonincreasing in e.
(iii) if only E invests, then U BSE (a*(e), e) is decreasing in e.
Proposition 5's primary contribution relative to Proposition 3 is its provision of results on aggregate welfare. (Proposition 3 provided these only when E was competitive so that V BSE ϭ V BS .) Under the assumptions of Proposition 5, aggregate welfare U BSE increases with exclusivity if and only if S is the party who invests externally. Intuitively, in these cases, each party's investment increases other parties' marginal contributions to all coalitions, thus raising their ex post bargaining payoffs. Because of this positive externality, all of the parties have socially suboptimal investment incentives. The effect of exclusivity on aggregate welfare then simply depends on whether exclusivity increases or decreases the investment, which depends on the identity of the investing party by Proposition 2. Using the analogy to asset ownership introduced in Section 2, the assumptions and results of Proposition 5 are analogous to those of Hart and Moore (1990) . 24 The result for situations in which B invests provides conditions in which the conclusion in the northeast corner of Figure 1 holds globally.
For the case of substitutable investment effects, we have the following additional welfare results when S and E's marginal contributions to the grand coalition are decreasing in the level of the investment a: Proposition 6. Suppose that A ʚ ᑬ, the investing party's payoff is responsive to external value, ‫ץ‬E [V BE (a, )]/‫ץ‬a Ͼ 0 for all a ∈ A, and a*(e) ∈ intA for all e. Suppose, in addition, that investment has substitutable effects and that [a*(e) , e] is increasing in e for e close to zero and U E [a*(e), e] is nonincreasing in e.
Proposition 6 shows that with substitutable investment effects when
is strictly negative, B and S will always sign an exclusive contract when B invests. Our previous result in Proposition 4 (summarized in the southeast corner of Figure 1 for the case of a competitive E) established that B and S would sign a fully exclusive contract, but it held only when external trade was never optimal. Intuitively, the result holds because B's investment then has a negative externality on S. Exclusivity raises their joint payoff by reducing B's investment incentives. In addition, Proposition 6 tells us that in this case E is necessarily made (weakly) worse off by such an arrangement, and so B and S have a socially excessive incentive to sign an exclusive contract.
Effects of exclusivity with multidimensional investments
Ⅲ While the effects of exclusivity are easiest to see when one party makes a onedimensional investment, this setting is quite restrictive. In reality, the parties often will ᭧ RAND 2000. have investment choices whose effects on internal and external values are not related in a simple one-to-one fashion. For example, a retailer who may be able to allocate his time to promote either of S or E's products may instead choose to promote neither product. Similarly, if S is training B how to use its product, S may be able to vary his emphasis on topics that benefit B when she procures from E. In addition, in many actual cases more than one party may have the opportunity to make investments. In this section we extend the analysis of the previous section to such cases.
In the study of multidimensional investments, it is convenient to separate each party j's investments a j into two components, ''internal'' investments a and ''external'' The key to understanding the effects of exclusivity lies in understanding the ways in which internal and external investments interact. Although exclusivity has no direct effect on internal investments (Proposition 1), it does have a direct effect on external investments, which in turn can indirectly induce changes in internal investments. There are three potential sources of such interactions:
Interactions in the investment cost functions j (a , a ) . This is, perhaps, the most As we have seen in Proposition 2, in these extreme cases the direction of the indirect effect of exclusivity on internal investments is fully determined by whether we have perfect investment cost substitutes or complements. More generally, however, internal and external investments may have a weaker form of cost interaction. For example, the retailer who can devote a i hours a day to promoting S's product and a e hours a day to promoting E's product may have a disutility cost of promotional effort that depends only on the total hours devoted to promotion, c(a i ϩ a e ). In such cases, two other kinds of interaction between internal and external investments can also be relevant for the direction of the indirect effect of exclusivity on internal investments.
Interactions of investments (a i , a e ) in the buyer's valuation v(·).
This type of interaction can arise in a number of ways. As one example, consider a situation in which a buyer can receive training in the use of both S and E's products from each of the two different sellers. If training in the use of one product reduces B's difficulty of learning about the other product, then this introduces a complementarity between these internal and external investments in v(·). On the other hand, if B's disutility of receiving one type of training is increased by having received the other (e.g., the disutility is time-related and B has decreasing marginal benefit for leisure), then these internal and external investments will be substitutes in v(·).
Interactions of trades (q S , q E ) in the buyer's valuation v(·)
. This is the most subtle form of interaction between internal and external investments. Of primary concern in antitrust analysis is the case in which q S and q E are substitutes in the buyer's valuation. This gives rise to an indirect substitutability between internal and external investments. For example, suppose again that B is a retailer, and q S and q E are her sales of two competing brands. Suppose also internal/external investments are complementary to internal/external trades respectively. Then B's promotion of the external brand increases the brand's optimal sales q E , thereby reducing the optimal sales of the internal brand q S , which in turn reduces B's marginal benefit of promoting the internal brand.
In general, all three of these types of interaction between internal and external activities will matter. To obtain definitive comparative statics results we need to identify conditions under which these effects do not counteract each other. To do so, we identify cases in which we can represent the investment game as a supermodular game, and we apply the monotone comparative statics results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) . 27 In some cases, all three types of interactions will reinforce each other. These are the cases of f ull internal/external complementarity and substitutability. Formally:
The supermodularity conditions for the case of full complementarity mean that: (a) internal and external goods are complements for the buyer; (b) investments increase the buyer's marginal valuations for trades and reduce the sellers' marginal costs; and (c) investments are investment cost complements. The conditions for the case of full substitutability mean that (a) internal and external goods are substitutes for the buyer; (b) internal (external) investments increase the buyer's marginal valuations for internal (external) trades, reduce the buyer's marginal valuation for external (internal) trades, and reduce the sellers' marginal costs of internal (external) trades; and (c) internal investments are investment cost substitutes to external investments.
The case of full complementarity corresponds closely to the conditions assumed by Hart and Moore (1990) . This case is of limited interest in antitrust analysis, however, which mainly concerns itself with situations in which the two sellers' goods are substitutes. When investments are complements in investment cost functions, but the goods are substitutes in the buyer's valuation, investment interactions of the third kind may counteract interactions of the first kind and rule out definitive comparative statics predictions. The case of perfect investment cost complements provides one setting in which internal and external investments must move together regardless of interactions ᭧ RAND 2000. of the third kind. Another such setting arises when the levels of efficient trade for all coalitions are independent of investments:
Definition 3. Trades are independent of investments if for all ∈ ⌰ there exists a triple (q*(), q (), q ()) ∈ Q ϫ Q S ϫ Q E such that for all a ∈ A we have * *
This condition is encountered, for example, when the buyer wants at most a single indivisible unit of either good and external trade is never efficient. This assumption has been made in the models of Holmström and Tirole (1991) and Hart (1995) . More generally, whether external or internal trade is efficient may depend on the realization of uncertainty , but not on the parties' investments a.
When trades are independent of investments we can obtain definitive comparative statics results with assumptions only on the first two types of interactions between internal and external investments. Formally, we will use the following notions:
Finally, our analysis in this section will make use of the following assumptions:
, Ϫc E (·) are continuous and nondecreasing in a.
Assumption 2. Q S , Q E , and A j for j ϭ B, S, E are complete lattices and min Q j ϭ 0 for j ∈ {S, E}.
Assumption 3. ͦA ͦ ϭ 1.
i E Assumption 1 says that investments increase B's utility and reduce S's costs. Assumption 1's continuity assumption and Assumption 2 are necessary for applying the theory of supermodular games of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , where the formal definition of a complete lattice can be found. Every compact product set in ᑬ k is a complete lattice: as one simple example, we could take q j ∈ [0, q j ] ʚ ᑬ ϩ for j ∈ {S, E} and a ∈ [0, a ] k ʚ ᑬ for some k. Alternatively, we might be in the often-studied situation k ϩ in which quantities are indivisible, so that q j ∈ {0, 1}. Assumption 3 says that E has no internal investment decision. Before turning to our comparative statics results, recall that in general our model may have multiple Nash equilibria, so that A*(e) need not be single-valued. Because we are now dealing with investments by more than one agent, and because we employ weaker assumptions than in Section 4, we can no longer show that any equilibrium selection a*(·) from A*(·) is monotonic as in Section 4. For this reason, our comparative statics results in this section will involve a weaker notion of monotonicity. Specifically, letting X and Y be two partially ordered sets, 28 we say that:
29 28 A partial ordering is a transitive, reflexive, and antisymmetric binary relation: see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) . 29 The concept is adapted from Milgrom and Roberts (1990) . Note that the definition applied to the correspondence A*(·) makes sense only when the maximum and minimum points in the equilibrium set exist. In fact, our assumptions ensure that the set of equilibrium investments in nonempty and has a maximum and minimum point (see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) ).
Definition 5. The correspondence G: X Y is nondecreasing if whenever xЈ
With these definitions, our general comparative statics result for complementary investments is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 7. Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold and that either (a) we have perfect investment cost complementarity, (b) we have full internal/external complementarity, or (c) we have internal/external investment complementarity and efficient trades are independent of investments.
(i) If only S has an external investment choice and a is a scalar, then A*(e) is e S nondecreasing in e.
(ii) If only B and/or E have external investment choices, then A*(e) is nonincreasing in e.
The proposition establishes that in all of the cases of complementarity defined in this section, exclusivity moves internal and external investments in the same direction, which is determined by the direct effects of exclusivity on external investments. It therefore serves as a multidimensional analog to Proposition 2 for the case of complementary investment effects (where exclusivity moved internal and external values in the same direction). For substitutable investments, our comparative statics result extends to the case of multidimensional investments as follows:
Proposition 8. Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold and that either (a) we have perfect investment cost substitutability, (b) we have full internal/external substitutability, or (c) we have internal/external investment substitutability and efficient trades are independent of investments. Define A*(e) ϭ {(Ϫa , a ): (a , a ) ∈ A*(e)}. The proposition establishes that when internal and external investments are substitutes in the sense defined above, exclusivity moves them in opposite directions.
Using the two above comparative statics results, we can also establish multidimensional analogs to all the welfare results of Section 4. 30 The only caveat concerns the local results stated in these propositions (i.e., the results that hold only when e is close enough to zero or to one). For these local results to hold with multidimensional investments, we need to know that all components of these investments have nonzero derivatives with respect to exclusivity.
More general contracts
Ⅲ Up to this point we have restricted our attention to an incomplete contracting setting in which B and S could specify only a probability e that external trade is not allowed. In this section, we consider the possibility that B and S might sign more elaborate contracts. In the first subsection we consider how our results are affected if B and S can specify a penalty that B must pay to S if B trades with E. Although we have not considered such terms up to now, they are in fact feasible under our informational assumptions. Then, in the second subsection we suppose that a court can verify trade, so that B and S can include not only an exclusivity provision in their ᭧ RAND 2000. contract, but also a contractually specified trade (or, perhaps, more elaborate options regarding trade).
▫ Penalties for external trade. Even when quantities cannot be described in advance, under our assumptions B and S can write a contract in which B must pay S a penalty P in compensation for the right to trade with E. In this case, a fully exclusive contract corresponds to P ϭ ϱ, while a nonexclusive contract (no contract) corresponds to P ϭ 0. It is immediate that such a contract can have no effect on the players' investment levels in the case in which all investments are internal. To see why, note that given investments a, state of nature , and penalty P, B will choose the level of e to maximize [␣ V BE (a, ) Ϫ P] (1 Ϫ e).
31 When investments are internal, V BE is in-
dependent of a, and therefore B's decision of whether to pay the penalty P must also be unaffected by a. Hence, this contract must create exactly the same incentives for investment as one that simply specifies a fixed level of exclusivity. Thus, allowing for such contracts preserves our irrelevance result. 32, 33 It is worth stressing the difference between this result and results for what may at first appear to be similar models in the literature on stipulated damages for breach of contract (see, for example, Chung (1992) and Spier and Whinston (1995) ). In that literature, the level of damages does affect players' choices of internal investments (such as a seller's investment in cost reduction). The critical difference, however, is that in that literature quantities are verifiable, and so it is possible to specify a price for trade (i.e., the buyer faces an option of whether to trade with the seller or not, with different prices attached to each option). Here, in contrast, the buyer must still bargain with the seller if trade is to occur. We shall say more about this difference in the next subsection.
▫ When quantities can be specified in advance. We now consider situations in which B and S can specify contractually not only an exclusivity term, but also the terms of trade between them (investments are still noncontractible). We begin by considering the role of exclusivity provisions in specific performance (i.e., fixed-quantity) contracts, and then we discuss more general contracts. Although a full analysis is beyond the scope of this article, here we seek to highlight a number of the issues that arise when contracts can include such provisions.
Specific performance contracts. Suppose that B and S sign a contract that specifies a fixed trade q S between them and a probability e ∈ [0, 1] that B is not allowed to trade with E (and possibly an upfront monetary transfer). We begin by showing how our irrelevance result generalizes to this setting. When B and S sign a contract (q S , e), we have the following coalitional values: 31 Here we have assumed that B must decide on the level of e prior to renegotiation. A similar irrelevance result holds if instead renegotiation occurs prior to B's choice of e (in this case, B will choose e in the event of a bargaining breakdown to maximize [V BE (a, ) Ϫ P](1 Ϫ e)).
32 More generally, a contract can make exclusivity contingent on announcements (messages) made by B and S. Similar logic shows that the irrelevance result also holds with these more general contracts.
33 When investments are not internal, direct extensions of our comparative static and welfare results are more difficult. Our results for e ϭ 0 and e ϭ 1 tell us what happens when P ϭ 0 and P ϭ ϱ, respectively. More generally, in some cases the results of Segal and Whinston (forthcoming) show that for any contract that specifies a penalty P, there is an equivalent contract that specifies the exclusivity probability e(P), where e(P) is an increasing function. In these cases we can employ our previous comparative statics results directly to analyze the effects of any change in P.
BSE BSE
Observe that, as before, exclusivity matters only through its effect on V BE . Our irrelevance result for internal investments extends to this setting for investments that are internal in the sense that: (a) they do not affect E's cost (i.e., c E (q E , a, ) is independent of a), and (b) B's value function can be written in the following separable form:
As in the incomplete contracts case, investments that affect only S's cost are internal. Now, however, investments that affect v(·) are internal only if they have no effect on B's willingness to pay for units of q E holding q S fixed (in the incomplete contracts case, this had to hold only when q S ϭ 0). 34 When investments are internal in this sense, we have
where
For example, an investment that effectively augments the units of S's product [i.e., for which the value function takes the form v(aq S , q E , )] would be purely internal if and only if ‫ץ‬ 2 v(·)/‫ץ‬q S ‫ץ‬q E ϭ 0, that is, if the products are independent. As an example in which investments are internal while products are not independent, B may be a retailer who sells q S and q E in separate markets, but who incurs joint inventory costs (equal to Ϫv(q S , q E , )) that are unaffected by investments. 35 Note that we could have described an equivalent model in which B consumes a continuous quantity up to an amount 1 and has utility that is linear in the amount consumed. In this case, q S would be a quantity rather than a probability.
Several points of interest follow from these expressions. First, note that if v E is independent of a, then exclusivity is irrelevant for ex ante investment incentives. Since in this case investment is internal, this is just the irrelevance result formulated in the beginning of this subsection.
Second, in some cases the optimal contract takes the form q S ϭ 0, in which case we are back to the incomplete contract setting considered earlier in the article. Specifically, suppose that only S invests and that his investments a S is a general investment in B's value from trade, i.e., v S (a S ) ϭ v E (a S ) ϵ v(a S ). Then S's ex post expected payoff is
S E
This expression implies that S's optimal choice of a S is weakly decreasing in q S . Since B's payoff is increasing in a S (holding e fixed), it follows that any contractual change that increases a S increases U BS (since a S has a positive externality on B; the formal argument parallels those in Sections 4 and 5). Hence, we conclude that it is optimal for B and S to write a contract that sets q S ϭ 0. (This is a simple extension of the result in Che and Hausch (1999) .) Given this fact, we can directly apply Proposition 3 to conclude that B and S optimally set e ϭ 1. Finally, in contrast to the two cases discussed above, in other cases the possibility of including a quantity provision in the contract can materially alter our conclusions about the use of exclusive contracts. To see this, suppose that B's investment a B ∈ ᑬ affects only v S (·) and v E (·), and S's investment a S ∈ ᑬ affects only c S (·). Then the efficient investments (a , a ) must satisfy the first-order conditions
and e ϭ 0, B and S are faced with precisely these first-order conditions. (This is a simple extension of Proposition 6 in Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) , which also implies that given the contract, efficient investment choices are globally optimal for the parties.) Hence, B and S can implement efficient investment levels without resorting to an exclusivity provision. Thus, while in this case exclusives can serve an efficiency-enhancing purpose in the incomplete contracting setting (for example, when v (·) and v (·) have Ј Ј S E different signs, so that B's investment has substitutable effects), once B and S can include a quantity provision in their contract, exclusives are no longer needed.
Price contracts. Once quantities can be specified, a wide range of contractual terms can be included in B and S's contract. As a general matter, we can imagine that the quantity, price, and extent of exclusivity can depend on announcements made by B and S. Here we restrict attention to one relatively simple contractual form, ''option-tobuy'' contracts, and maintain our focus on the example introduced in the previous subsection. An option-to-buy contract ( p, e) specifies a price p at which B may elect to take delivery of a unit from S, and a probability e that B is allowed to procure from E. The timing is that c E is first realized, then B decides whether to exercise the option, then the exclusivity realization occurs, and finally B and S can renegotiate with the option exercise decision as the default outcome. Given a contract ( p, e) and realization c E , B will exercise the option if and only if doing so increases his utility at his default outcome, i.e., if and only if
Let q S (a, e, p, c E ) denote the realized quantity given B's optimal exercise decision. Now, B's and S's expected ex post payoffs are W(a, e, p) ,
Suppose now that a ∈ ᑬ. Assuming that the distribution of c E is nonatomic so that the function W(·) is differentiable in a, by the envelope theorem (see Milgrom and Segal (forthcoming) ) we have
Thus, the option price p affects the equilibrium level of investment through its effect on E[q S (a, e, p, c E )], the expected quantity exercised by the buyer under the optionto-buy clause (this is precisely the effect identified in the literature on stipulated damages). Now, let q S ϭ E[q S (a*, e, p, c E )], where a* is the equilibrium investment level under the contract. Then it is simple to see that the first-order condition for a would be unchanged if instead B and S wrote the specific performance contract (q S , e). Thus, with one-dimensional investment, we can always find a specific performance contract that is equivalent to any option-to-buy contract as long as second-order conditions are satisfied. 36 This implies that the effects of exclusivity when the parties optimally adjust price in option-to-buy contracts are the same as when the parties optimally adjust quantity in specific performance contracts. In particular, the ''irrelevance result'' continues to hold here: if investments are internal, banning exclusives would have no effect on investments when the parties can optimally adjust contractual price.
This conclusion stands in contrast to results presented in Gilbert and Shapiro (1997) , who also study the effects of exclusivity on investments in settings in which price terms can be included in contracts. Gilbert and Shapiro argue that exclusives do increase the level of the seller's cost-reducing investment (which is internal). The difference in results is due to the fact that Gilbert and Shapiro identify the results of changing e holding all other contract terms fixed. However, in response to a change in the level of exclusivity, B and S can be expected to alter these other terms. In the case of a seller investing in cost reduction, what we have shown is that by altering the price term appropriately (specifically, by keeping the expected contractual trade E[q S (a, e, p, c E )] unchanged), B and S can achieve the same outcome regardless of the level of e. 
Conclusion
Ⅲ The foregoing analysis provides a number of results regarding the effects of exclusivity on noncontractible investments and welfare. On a very practical level, these results can be used to evaluate claims about the use of exclusive contracts to protect investments. For example, consider the investments of Ticketmaster in personnel training and software configuration described in the Introduction. Because of the proprietary nature of Ticketmaster's system, these investments could not be used by the buyer in conjunction with other systems, so they were internal in our terminology. Our irrelevance result therefore casts doubt on the claimed efficiency motivation for Ticketmaster's exclusive contracts. More generally, when investments do have an external effect, our analysis identifies when a buyer and seller would and would not wish to sign an exclusive contract, and it also indicates when such arrangements are socially efficient. Figure 1 , in particular, provides a checklist for evaluating the logical consistency of efficiency-based claims for exclusive contracts for cases in which the supply side of the market is argued to be competitive.
Our findings relate to some arguments that have been made in the literatures on transfer pricing, second sourcing, human capital investments, and outsourcing. In their study of transfer pricing, Holmström and Tirole (1991) investigate the investment incentives of division managers under various organizational arrangements, including those that prohibit external trade. Their model differs from ours in several respects: first, it considers the effect of imposing exclusivity on both the buyer and seller at once, second, it allows explicit compensation schemes, and third, it is substantially more specialized. Despite these differences, our results are reminiscent of some of the effects identified by Holmström and Tirole. For example, they find that prohibiting external trade may be beneficial because it discourages managers' rent-seeking investments in external activities. This parallels our result on the beneficial effect of exclusivity when the buyer's external and internal investments are substitutes (see the southeast cell of Figure 1 ). Holmström and Tirole also find that ''nonintegration'' may be good because it encourages general investments by managers, which parallels our result that exclusivity is harmful when B's internal and external investments are complements (see the northeast cell of Figure 1 ).
The northeast cell of Figure 1 also has parallels to cases of second-sourcing (Farrell and Gallini, 1988; Shepard, 1987) in which a supplier elects to establish a competitive source of supply to elicit greater levels of general investments by B. The main difference is that in the second-sourcing literature the seller either shares the licensing surplus with the licensee or licenses unilaterally at a zero fee. To analyze the optimality of these decisions, we would need to consider the effect of exclusivity (nonlicensing) on the ex ante surplus of coalitions SE and S.
In his classic treatise on human capital, Becker (1964) observes that firms have a socially suboptimal incentive to invest in general training of their employees. He also notes that a firm's incentive to make such investment is increased when it has a degree of monopsony over employees (exemplified by an isolated company town). 38 Interpreting the firm as a ''seller'' who competes with other firms (''external sellers'') for a worker (the ''buyer''), this parallels our finding that exclusivity may be good when the seller's internal and external investments are complements (the northwest cell of Figure 1 ).
Another application of this result to labor economics concerns union contracts that restrict outsourcing. While it is common to attribute such restrictions to unions' attempt ᭧ RAND 2000. to maintain their ''power,' ' Baron and Kreps (1999) argue that such contracts enhance efficiency, by encouraging cooperation between workers and the firm. Our analysis suggests another efficiency justification for outsourcing restrictions: it encourages union members to invest in improving the firm's profitability in ways that would be appropriable by the firm absent the restrictions.
Appendix

Ⅲ
Proofs of Proposition 4-8 and Lemma 1 follow. propositions are not. With a slight abuse of notation, in Lemma A1 we write the arguments of the functions V J (·) and j (·) as ( a , e, ) and a j to allow later interpretations of a as either (a i , a e ) or (Ϫa i , a e ) and of e as either e or Ϫe.
Lemma A1. Suppose that (i) Assumptions 1-3 hold.
(ii) for all ∈ ⌰ every marginal contribution M (a, e, ) ϭ [V J ʜj (a, e, ) Ϫ V J (a, e, )] is continuous J j in a, supermodular in a j , and has increasing differences between a j and (a Ϫj , e ), 39 (iii) the investment cost functions have the property that Ϫ j (a j ) is supermodular in a j for j ∈ {B, S, E}.
Then the set A*(e ) of Nash equilibrium investment vectors a is nondecreasing in e.
Proof. A nonnegatively weighted sum of functions preserves the properties of continuity, supermodularity, and increasing differences. Each player j's ex post payoff in state given (a, e ), U j (a, e, ), is a nonnegatively weighted sum of marginal contributions and the negative of investment costs. In turn, player j's ex ante payoff given (a, e ), U j (a, e ), is a nonnegatively weighted sum of the functions U j (a, e, ). Therefore, the investment game is supermodular and the result follows from the corollary to Theorem 6 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. For each case, the proof consists of establishing that the conditions of Lemma A1 hold for the appropriately chosen (a, e ). Consider part (i) first with full internal/external complementarity (case (b)). We shall show that the requirements of Lemma A1 are satisfied taking (a, e ) ϭ (a, e). Note that in this case ͦA E ͦ ϭ 1, so that every marginal contribution of E, M (a, e, ), trivially satisfies the assumptions of Lemma A1.
J E
Now consider the marginal contributions of B and S. Note first that since M (a, e, ) ϭ 0, this E S marginal contribution trivially satisfies the requirements of Lemma A1. For the remaining marginal contributions, recall that Topkis (1998) establishes that if a function f : X ϫ Y → ᑬ is supermodular on a sublattice X ϫ Y, then the function g(x) ϭ max y ∈ Y f (x, y) is supermodular on X. This tells us that under full internal/external cost complementarity, every coalitional value V J (a, ) is supermodular in a. Since M (a, e, ) ϭ V j ʜ J (a, ) for ( j, J ) ∈ {(S, B), (B, SE ), (B, S )}, these marginal J j contributions are supermodular in (a, e) and so satisfy the requirements of Lemma A1 (a supermodular function satisfies increasing differences in all pairs of variables). Next, note that in part (i) we have M (a, e, ) ϭ (1 Ϫ e)V BE (a , ). Hence, M (a, e, ) also trivially satisfies the conditions of Lemma A1. in a S and e. Since these properties are preserved under addition, this implies that M (a, e, ) has the
BE S
properties required in Lemma A1. Thus, all of the requirements of Lemma A1 are met taking (a , e) ϭ (a, e). The proof of part (ii) follows similarly but taking (a, e) ϭ (a, Ϫe). The proofs for cases (a) and (c) follow similar lines. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8. Similar to that of Proposition 7, except that we take (a, e) ϭ (a e , Ϫa i , e) for part (i) and (a, e) ϭ (a e , Ϫa i , Ϫe) for part (ii). Q.E.D.
